Weaponized Words: Equipping Students to Recognize and Resist Modern Propaganda
This case study was produced as a graduate school assignment. However, the theories and frameworks are effective for business, academic, and non-profit organizations.
Executive Summary
MediaAware is a non-profit consultant and educational organization dedicated to media literacy. School districts engage in our consultancy services to develop research-based training frameworks to help educators counter modern disinformation in classroom settings. This case study applies two complementary concepts, Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model and Inoculation Theory, to create a strategic and actionable curriculum grounded in communication research and historical insight. Our recommended approach moves beyond fact-checking to build a deeper understanding of propaganda mechanisms and develop psychological resistance through controlled exposure to weakened manipulation techniques. Students armed with both analytical frameworks and practical defense strategies become adults with the skills needed to assess the media they consume critically.
Introduction
We live in increasingly divided times, fueled by a constant barrage of political polarization, AI-generated misinformation proliferates, and eroded public trust in institutions. Students have never been more vulnerable to these trends as they spend hours encased in digital environments designed to maximize engagement rather than accuracy or context. The complex algorithmic amplification of extreme content, combined with highly sophisticated manipulation techniques ripped straight from Cold War playbooks, has created a perfect storm for contemporary propaganda. That threat disrupts more than individual decision-making; it fractures the very foundations of democratic discourse. As visual misinformation and deepfakes become ever more indistinguishable from reality, the need for comprehensive media literacy education has never been more urgent.
MediaAware, a non-profit educational organization, has identified a critical challenge in its mission to promote media literacy: educators struggle to effectively explain the systemic nature of propaganda and provide students with compelling defense strategies. Educators and parents report feeling overwhelmed by the extensive and advanced technology malicious actors use to deliver disinformation and the rapid pace at which new strategies emerge. Our strategic, research-based, and historically informed recommendations leverage communication theories and historical connections to inform actionable classroom activities. From debunking videos to digital toolkits, MediaAware provides insight into the most impactful propaganda defense methods.
Communication Theories in Action
MediaAware recognizes the need for a strong theoretical and historical basis from which to build effective programs that guard against modern propaganda. To accomplish the goal of giving students the necessary skills to fend off media manipulation, we turn to two concepts from which we build our recommendations: The propaganda Model by Herman and Chomsky and the Inoculation theory by William McGuire. We use the propaganda model to help us define the current threat while deploying inoculation theory as a means of defense.
Propaganda Model
Herman and Chomsky developed the propaganda model in 1988, and they outline a systematic analysis of how information becomes filtered through various media systems before reaching the public. While originally designed to evaluate traditional media outlets (e.g., print media, television, and radio), the propaganda model is just as effective today as media channels have exploded to include social media and artificial intelligence (AI). The five filters that influence what media makes it to individuals include:
The filters of the Propaganda Model influence how companies modify media exposure to suit their needs.
· Ownership: “[the] profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 71). Identifying who owns the information being disseminated.
· Advertising: “the primary income source of the mass media” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 72). Ad dollars are often the sole income stream for many outlets.
· Sourcing: “reliance of the media on information provided by [organizations] funded and approved by primary sources and agents of power” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 72). Tracing where information comes from.
· Flak: “a means of disciplining the media” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 72). The regulatory retribution for propaganda or false information.
· Anticommunism: "A national religion and control mechanism" (Fuchs, 2018, p. 72). The ideological motivations for filtering content.
Anticommunism is a relic of the Cold War, and in modern contexts, ideology replaces this filter. Altogether, this model is a powerful tool for recognizing how propaganda functions in modern digital spaces. Rather than allowing students to become overwhelmed with the level of misinformation they currently face, MediaAware uses the Propaganda model as a systematic framework for recognizing the structural forces that shape our contemporary message environments.
Inoculation Theory
Students guard themselves against propaganda campaigns through the foundation of inoculation theory.
Where the propaganda model provides a foundation for recognizing misinformation, inoculation theory directs our curriculum, materials, and recommendations for students. Inoculation theory presents three components to disarm misinformation: threat, refutational preemption, and a conclusion. The threat component is a straightforward “forewarning of a potential persuasive attack on beliefs, making sure the target of the persuasive effort is aware of their susceptibility to the attack” (Dainton & Zelly, 2023, p. 127). Refutation preemption is an exposure to a weakened form of the argument or "[an anticipation of] the counter-persuasive effort by raising specific challenges and then contesting them" (Dainton & Zelly, 2023, p. 128). In this way, the inoculation theory acts like a communicative vaccine where the conclusion is the logical epiphany one makes after exposure.
Inoculation theory is especially powerful in our modern contexts, such as refuting vaccine conspiracy theories (Compton et al., 2021). Studies show that when inoculation strategies are used, resistant attitudes toward healthcare diminish by a statistically significant amount (Compton et al., 2016). Furthermore, inoculation theory "has been applied to a number of contexts (e.g., politics, health) in its 50+ year history" (Compton et al., 2021) with marked promise for substantial boosts in protection against the social issues that students face as they navigate social media influences, AI hallucinations, and mass media manipulation.
Echoes of the Cold War: Why Media Literacy is Vital for Students
Fake news, misinformation, and disinformation are all terms used to hide the tragic echoes of the past. Despite the rebranding, these terms still describe propaganda, and unfortunately, we experience Cold War tactics daily. The fearmongering, scapegoating, and repetition found in Cold War propaganda playbooks all have modern homes. One notorious example is Russia’s influence over public opinion about its war in Ukraine by “inflaming discord…[inciting] discord between different ethnic groups of people. And this, in turn, can lead to social unrest” (Maksymenko & Derkach, 2024) and “influencing elections [by] spreading fake news about candidates or manipulating voting results” (Maksymenko & Derkach, 2024). During the post-WWII years, both the Soviet Union and the United States deployed these methods, among others, to obtain their goals, showing the importance of students who are capable of criticizing their own governments.
However, propaganda did not take a back seat between in the years between the fall of the Soviet Union and modern political turmoil. Recent history is littered with instances of these Cold War strategies, including the United States’ entry into Iraq in 2003, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, China’s “ghost cities” officially recognized in 2009, and the Mexican drug cartel's campaigns against journalists and Mexican civilians that continue today. In 2016, our modern propaganda experience exploded with the drama of the presidential election campaign, evidence of election tampering, widespread social media movements, and extreme violence.
Today’s Disinformation Outlook
Our modern technology fuels hyperactive propaganda campaigns with a massive impact.
Today’s disinformation outlook looks even more bleak than it did in 2016. We have faced pandemics, two traumatic presidential elections, a volatile economy, and global unrest. The vast number of platforms available for media consumption makes navigating propaganda even more challenging for the younger generations; as one study put it, "In modern high-choice media environments, exposure to misinformation can be harmful and can have negative consequences for democratic governance as well as trust in news media" (Dan et al., 2021). Beyond politics, that danger extends to individuals, where fake news can drive people to self-harm or violence. Furthermore, growing misinformation campaigns have real-world implications, with infrastructure systems now at risk as prime targets for attacks that escalate beyond social influence into cybersecurity threats, such as ransomware and blackmail.
Driving the significant risks to mental health and public safety are the growing number of technological advancements that enable such influence. Social media was only the beginning. We must now contend with artificial intelligence and machine learning, which malicious actors are using to create “AI-powered social bots [that] can think and act on social media platforms in ways similar to humans” (Hajili et al., 2021). Thousands, and even millions, of these bots can flood social media platforms with false or highly polarizing narratives that put students and their parents at risk. In addition to AI bots, deepfake videos, photographic manipulation, algorithmic amplification, and influencer echo chambers all leverage the emotional psychology of manipulation to significant effect. As a result, the need for adequate communicative protection in today's students demands resources backed by research and history, such as the tools and recommendations provided by MediaAware.
Action Plan: A Curriculum Based on Strategy
To help students and their parents recognize propaganda with techniques beyond simple fact-checking, MediaAware’s curriculum builds deeper rhetorical literacy in students, especially those in grades 6 through 12. Inoculation theory, as highlighted above, is the perfect framework for our approach, as it exposes students to weakened forms of propaganda techniques before they encounter them in the real world. Through historical comparisons with active debunking exercises, students develop "cognitive antibodies." These cognitive antibodies teach students pattern recognition rather than reactive responses to false claims. In partnership with MediaAware, educators should implement the following curriculum components into social studies, English, or civics courses:
· Graduated “threat” workshops where students learn to identify rhetorical tactics, starting with simple appeals (ethos, pathos, logos) and advancing to complex manipulation techniques (scapegoating and false dichotomies).
· Deliver a debunking video series showing weakened examples of manipulative techniques paired with explanations and activities of how to recognize and counter them.
· Distribute a digital toolkit with downloadable resources for teachers and educators for immediate use in the classroom.
· Engage in role-playing exercises that challenge students’ skills before encountering them in real-world contexts.
· Host a media awareness week with games, prizes, and challenges that engage students.
These theory-supported activities transform students from passive media consumers into active critical thinkers. As students practice identification and refutation in a controlled educational environment, they build lasting resistance to manipulation. Even as tools like descriptive, factual labeling that mimics nutritional facts evolve to combat propaganda (Spradling et al., 2021), students can transfer their media awareness skills to emerging forms of communication that we have not yet encountered.
Conclusion
Thanks to modern digital advancements, the propaganda ecosystem presents a massive challenge for today’s youth. As they begin to navigate their online-first environment, they face a landscape designed to manipulate rather than inform. Through a systematic understanding provided by the propaganda model combined with the practical resistance of inoculation theory, MediaAware’s curriculum and recommendations offer a powerful, action-based defense system against misinformation. This theory-backed approach empowers students to identify individual falsehoods and recognize the underlying patterns, systems, and actors that produce propaganda. These transferable skills will remain practical for a lifetime, even as manipulation tactics evolve.
When schools implement these strategies, they build media literacy and democratic resilience in future generations. Instead of protecting individual students from manipulation, our recommendations strengthen a collective information community by creating more discerning media consumers who demand better from content creators and journalistic outlets. Although our modern world bears witness to weaponized words that increasingly threaten social cohesion and democracy, students with these cognitive defenses represent one of the most important educational priorities of our time: ensuring that future citizens can distinguish rhetoric from reality.
Reference
Compton, J., Jackson, B., & Dimmock, J. A. (2016). Persuading others to avoid persuasion: Inoculation theory and resistant health attitudes. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 122. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00122
Compton, J., van der Linden, S., Cook, J., & Basol, M. (2021). Inoculation theory in the post-truth era: Extant findings and new frontiers for contested science, misinformation, and conspiracy theories. Soc Personal Psychol Compass, 15: e12602. https://doi-org.uccs.idm.oclc.org/10.1111/spc3.12602
Dan, V., Paris, B., Donovan, J., Hameleers, M., Roozenbeek, J., van der Linden, S., & von Sikorski, C. (2021). Visual mis- and disinformation, social media, and democracy. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 98(3), 641-664. https://doi-org.uccs.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/10776990211035395 (Original work published 2021)
Dainton, M. & Zelly, E. D. (2023). Applying communication theory for professional life, 5th ed. Sage Publications.
Fuchs, C. (2018). Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the age of the internet, big data and social media. In J. Pedro-Carañana, D. Broudy, & J. Klaehn (Eds.), THE PROPAGANDA MODEL TODAY: Filtering Perception and Awareness (Vol. 8, pp. 71–92). University of Westminster Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv7h0ts6.8
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